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THE GAINS FROM TRADE ONCE AGAIN' 
By JAGDISH BHAGWATI 
IN a pair of brilliant, companion papers Professors Paul Samuelson [6] and 
Murray Kemp [2] have carried the analysis of the gains from trade (derived 
by a single country) significantly beyond Samuelson's classic contribution 
[4] of 1939. 
While the majority of the theorems stated in these papers are valid, in- 
cluding the significant extension of the theorem that free trade is superior to 
no trade to the case of countries enjoying monopoly power in trade, the 
analysis needs to be qualified and can be extended in respect of two im- 
portant theorems stated (only) by Professor Kemp. 
More specifically, the following theorem needs to be qualified: that, for a 
country with neither monopoly power in trade nor domestic distortions, a 
higher tariff is inferior to a lower tariff. Moreover, Kemp's remarkable 
theorem that restricted trade is superior to no trade is valid only if the restric- 
tion results from tariffs, quotas or exchange restrictions and cannot be sus- 
tained as a logically true proposition if taxes and subsidies on domestic 
production or consumption are introduced, quite legitimately, as possible 
methods of trade restriction. 
Section I begins with a restatement of the proof of Samuelson's classic 
theorem that free trade is superior to no trade, stating the proof in a way 
which brings out certain essential aspects with greater emphasis. Section II 
discusses Kemp's proposition that restricted trade is superior to no trade in 
relation to trade-restricting policies other than tariffs and (equivalent) 
quotas or exchange restrictions. Section III shows Kemp's contention that, 
for a small country, a higher tariff is inferior to a lower tariff needs to be 
qualified unless inferiority of the exportable commodity in social consump- 
tion is ruled out. 
I. Free trade vs. no trade 
The proposition that free trade (in the sense of a policy resulting in the 
equalization of domestic and foreign prices, and hence excluding policies 
such as trade, production and consumption taxes, subsidies and quotas) is 
superior to no trade has been proved in Samuelson's 1939 [4] and recent [6] 
papers. The precise sense in which it is valid, and the conditions under 
which it can be interpreted as an efficiency rule by systems not using the 
price mechanism, are brought out clearly by recasting Samuelson's basic 
argument along the following lines where a sharp distinction is drawn 
between technical efficiency and utility improvement and emphasis is 
1 I wish to thank Professors Murray Kemp and Paul Samuelson for valuable corres- 
pondence and Mr. V. K. Ramaswami for discussion of Section III. 
4520.2 L 
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138 THE GAINS FROM TRADE ONCE AGAIN 
pointedly placed on the fact that the proposition that free trade is superior 
to no trade relates to a competitive price system whereas the fact that the 
opportunity to trade (i.e., the trade situation) is superior to the no-trade 
situation holds regardless of the institutional assumptions made. 
For simplicity, assume that the productive factors are fixed in supply, 
that the country has no monopoly power in trade and that the technology 
is such as to result in a strictly convex production possibility set.' The 
following three propositions can then be established. 
Proposition 1: The trade situation (i.e., the opportunity to trade) is 
superior to the no-trade situation (i.e., the absence of trade opportunity), 
from the viewpoint of technical efficiency. 
Proposition 2: Under perfect competition, free trade will enable the 
economy to operate with technical efficiency. 
Proposition 3: Under perfect competition, free trade will enable the 
economy to maximize utility, subject to the given constraints, so that, 
from the viewpoint of utility-wise ranking as well, free trade is superior to 
no trade. 
For Proposition (1), remember that technical efficiency is defined in the 
usual, Paretian sense. Hence Proposition I merely states that it is possible 
to get more of one good and no less of the other when the opportunity to 
trade is available than when it is not. 
This is readily seen in Fig. 1, similar to Samuelson's illustration, where 
the price-line CD = EF represents the international prices and OAB the 
production possibility set. If production is set at P and trade is undertaken 
(as it must be) at the stated international prices, OEF becomes the avail- 
ability set and EF the availability frontier, the Pareto-efficient locus of 
available combinations of the two commodities. But if production is set 
instead at P*, the availability set is the largest possible, at OCD, and CD 
represents the most efficient, Pareto-optimal availability line subject to the 
domestic and foreign transformation constraints.2 On the other hand, AB, 
the production possibility frontier, represents the efficient, availability line 
in the absence of trade opportunity. 
It is thus clear immediately, since CD lies uniformly outside AB (though 
1 The first assumption is not necessary for proving any of the three propositions that 
follow, as reference to Samuelson [6] and Kemp [2] will show. It is being introduced here 
merely to simplify the analysis and keep to a geometrical exposition without difficulty. On 
the other hand, note that the assumption of absence of monopoly power in trade is necessary 
for propositions (2) and (3), because they both refer to the optimality of free trade, which 
disappears where there is monopoly power in trade (as discussed in p. 140, n. 1). However, 
free trade, while not being the optimal policy when there is monopoly power in trade, is 
none the less a superior (though sub-optimal) policy to no trade, as Kemp [21 has shown. 
2 Note that any shift of production from P*, and trade therefrom, to production at another 
point (such as P) and trade from that new point will only reduce the availability set open to 
the economy. Hence, production at P* represents the most efficient production point, from. 
which trade can be conducted. 
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touching it at P*), that any bundle of commodities which is available by 
production alone (i.e., in the no trade situation) can be improved upon 
(with one borderline case at P*) by production at P* and trade therefrom. 
Hence, the opportunity to trade represents for the economy a superior 








0 B F D X 
FIG. 1. Without trade, APP*B represents the production possibility, and hence 
availability (or consumption possibility), frontier. If unlimited trade is possible at 
the world price ratio given by CD's slope, the new availability frontier is given by 
CP*D, the farthest-out line with slope CD that touches the domestic, production 
possibility frontier. Any domestic welfare function (of the standard, static variety) 
will be maximized at a point such as C*, which gives more welfare than any point 
within APP*B (save in the singular case where C* and P* happen to coincide). 
superior to the no trade situation (in the sense of Paretian, technical 
efficiency). 
Note that this proposition merely states that it is possible, if the trade 
opportunity is exploited in a certain way, to have more of one good and no 
less of the other(s) under trade than under no trade. The proposition does 
not assert anything as to whether a specific, economic system will in fact 
manage to utilize the trade opportunity in this technically efficient manner. 
Of course the proposition that trade could expand the economy's avail- 
abilities is hardly surprising once one realizes that the possibility of trade 
really adds yet another 'technological' process of transforming export- 
ables into importables, and this cannot but improve (or, at worst, leave 
unchanged) the availabilities defined by the domestic resource and tech- 
nological constraints. 
On the other hand, Proposition 2 relates explicitly to whether an actual, 
institutional system will operate with technical efficiency. It states that, for 
This content downloaded  on Wed, 6 Feb 2013 15:51:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
140 THE GAINS FROM TRADE ONCE AGAIN 
a competitive price system, free trade will in fact enable the economy to 
exploit the trade opportunity most effectively and thus operate efficiently 
[i.e., bring production to P* and trade along CP*D in Fig. 1]. The proof of 
this proposition is straightforward and rests on the fact that with (i) free 
trade, constituting the equalization of foreign and domestic prices, and (ii) 
perfect competition, with the assumed technology, assuring the equaliza- 
tion of domestic prices with the marginal rate of transformation in pro- 
duction (on the production possibility frontier), the economy must 
necessarily end up producing and trading efficiently. To illustrate, under 
free trade at price CD _ EF, the economy will produce at P* and trade 
along CD, thus operating with technical efficiency. 
Note further that Proposition 2 can be readily adapted for institutional 
frameworks other than that of a competitive, price system. Thus, for an 
economic system which does not use (domestic) prices to guide production, 
it is conceivable that an alternative way of operating with efficiency would 
be for planners to follow the rule of equating foreign prices with the marginal 
rate of transformation of products in domestic production.' This efficiency 
rule would ensure the operation of the economy at technical efficiency; in 
Fig. (1), the planners would be guided by the rule of producing at P* and 
thus trading along CP*D. Free trade merely happens to be the policy which 
enables a competitive, price system to implement this efficiency rule.2 
It is now possible to go beyond questions of technical efficiency and raise 
the issue of utility-wise ranking of free trade and no trade. If we take a 
well-ordered, social utility index, Proposition 3 follows immediately.3 For 
1 For a country, however, which enjoys monopoly power in trade, the rule modifies to the 
well-known prescription to equate the marginal terms of trade with the marginal rate of 
transformation in domestic production. The rule can be obtained more directly by maximiz- 
ing the availability of one commodity subject to specified level(s) of the other(s), subject 
further to the constraints imposed by the implicit, domestic transformation function and the 
foreign reciprocal demand function. 
2 Following on this, I have found it useful, in the classroom, to tell my Indian students 
that even a 'Soviet-type' economic system, which may decide to avoid the use of prices to 
guide domestic allocation of resources, cannot afford to ignore international prices, the 
reason being that they really represent, from the welfare point of view, a 'technological' 
datum. I may also add that the distinction between Propositions 2 and 3, based on the dis- 
tinction between technical efficiency and utility maximization, is also very useful if one is 
teaching students living in a 'planned' economy; Professor Bent Hansen, who has taught in 
Cairo for some years, told me some time ago that he has also found it useful to teach free 
trade optimality in terms of Propositions 1 and 2 above. 
3 Formally, we would be maximizing a function such as U = U(X, Y) where U stands for 
social welfare, X and Y for the available commodities and the function has the standard 
properties [5] such as 
AU AU dX d2X 
-> O- > O, - < O and < 0. ax a~y dY dY2< 
U = constant U = constant 
This function would be maximized subject to the implicit, domestic transformation function 
and the foreign reciprocal demand function. It would then be shown that, under free trade, a 
perfectly competitive system would satisfy the investigated maximizing conditions. 
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those not anxious to raise questions about the incomparability of different 
persons' utilities and who are ready to accept a well-ordered social utility 
index, this procedure is entirely satisfactory.' But those who, reluctant to 
go beyond consideration of utility for each (incomparable) individual, wish 
to base utility-wise rankings on the superior-for-all-income-distributions 





0 (Utility of Individual 2) U2 
FIG. 2. QTR represents the utility possibility curve, in a two-person 
economy, corresponding to the no trade situation. KTL represents the 
utility possibility curve corresponding to the free-trade situation. KTL 
lies uniformly outside QTR (though touching it at T), indicating that 
the free-trade situation is superior (or, at minimum, equivalent) to the 
no-trade situation from the viewpoint of social welfare. 
used by Samuelson [6] and Kemp [2]. They argue, quite correctly, that the 
fact that CD, the availability frontier under free trade, lies uniformly out- 
side (though once touching) AB, the availability frontier under no trade, 
implies that the utility possibility locus for the free trade situation must 
also lie uniformly outside (though possibly touching) that for the no-trade 
situation, as illustrated in Fig. 2 for a two-person economy. This implies 
that, under free trade, for any utility distribution (except at the point(s) 
where the two loci touch)2 achieved under no trade, it is possible (via ideal 
1 For those unwilling to assume that laissez-faire can be counted on to provide the ethically 
proper income distribution and yet want to use a social utility index, Samuelson's [6] con- 
struction of 'social indifference curves' is the appropriate reference. 
2 As Professor Samuelson has pointed out to me in correspondence, the free-trade utility 
possibility locus may even coincide with the no-trade utility possibility locus if all individuals 
are alike and have unitary income elasticities, and if C* in Fig. 1 coincides with P*. 
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142 THE GAINS FROM TRADE ONCE AGAIN 
lump-sum taxes and subsidies) to achieve a higher level for both indi- 
viduals. Hence, free trade is (unambiguously) superior (or, at minimum, 
equal) to no trade (for all income distributions).' 
II. Restricted trade vs. no trade 
Kemp [2] has further argued that, for utility-wise ranking, restricted 
trade is superior to no trade. While all forms of trade cannot be shown to 
be (always) superior to no trade, can the classes of trade considered be 
narrowed down to 'restricted trade' and this sub-set be shown to be 
superior to no trade ? 
Kemp is certainly right when the restriction is brought about by three 
classes of policies: tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions. Each of these 
policies will restrict trade by introducing an inequality between foreign 
prices on the one hand and domestic prices faced by producers and con- 
sumers on the other hand. These are in fact the policies spelled out by Kemp 
in his statement of the theorem. Thus he argues [2]: 
In the present section I shall argue the more general proposition that compensated 
free trade or compensated restricted trade is better than no trade. (It is understood, 
of course, that the restrictions are not prohibitive). The manner in which trade is 
restricted is unimportant; the same conclusions hold for tariffs, quantitative com- 
modity controls or exchange restrictions. 
But suppose, however, that trade is restricted by a production subsidy 
(or, alternatively tax) on importables (or, alternatively exportables)-a 
method which is not merely a theoretical possibility but also frequently in 
vogue. Kemp's theorem cannot be extended to this case, as seen by 
reference to Fig. 3 where a production subsidy (or, alternatively tax) on Y 
1 Note, however, that while it is correct to argue that (utility-wise) free trade is superior to 
no trade, it is not true that any kind of trade is better than no trade. 
Samuelson states, in his earlier 1939 paper [4, p. 239], that 'free trade or some trade is to be 
preferred to no trade at all'. In the later 1962 paper in this Journal [6] as well, the argument 
is stated in terms of 'some trade'. 'Some trade', however, is not to be interpreted as equiva- 
lent to 'any trade'; and it should be noted that Samuelson's method of proof indeed fully 
supports this presumption. In correspondence Professor Samuelson has pointed out that this 
is definitely the proper interpretation of his theorem. 
It can be easily shown in fact that any kind of trade cannot be shown to be superior to no 
trade. Take, for example, Figure 3 in the text. It shows that, for an economy with no 
monopoly power in trade, a production subsidy (or, alternatively tax) on commodity Y (or, 
alternatively X) can bring domestic prices for producers to Dp and production to PT, con- 
sumption (at international prices Fp) to CT and social utility locus Us ( > UT). Thus a policy 
of trade (involving specifically a production tax-cum-subsidy policy combined with other- 
wise-free trade) is inferior to that of no trade for the specific income distribution implicit in 
the social utility index employed, and hence it will be impossible, in this instance, for the 
gainers in the trade situation to compensate the losers without themselves becoming worse 
off than in the no-trade situation. This conclusion is readily understandable because, as we 
know from the theory of Second Best, it is not possible in general to rank uniquely (for all 
income distributions) two sub-optimal policies: and, trade and no trade are both sub-optimal 
policies for a country with no monopoly power in trade (unless trade amounts specifically to 
free trade, which is the optimal policy). 
2 This has been shown in the preceding footnote. 
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(or, alternatively X) has reduced trade below the free-trade level but the 
welfare level at UT is below the no-trade welfare level at Us. On the other 
hand, if productive resources are assumed to be given in supply and 
monopoly power in trade is absent, Kemp's theorem can be shown to be 
valid (for utility-wise ranking) even for a production subsidy (tax) on im- 







0 B X 
FIG. 3. APS B represents the domestic, production possibility curve. In the absence 
of trade, the welfare level is at Us. Under free trade at the given world price ratio 
measured by the slope of Fp, welfare will increase (UF > US). If, however, an appro- 
priate subsidy (or, alternatively tax) on the production of Y (or, alternatively X) is 
introduced along with otherwise-free trade, production will shift to PT and con- 
sumption to CT, the volume of trade will be reduced below the free-trade level, and 
the welfare level reduced below that under no trade (UT < US), thus demonstrating 
that restricted trade would, in this instance, be inferior to no trade. 
the domestic production of importables above the no-trade level. A larger 
subsidy (tax) than this would open up the possibility, illustrated by Fig. 3, 
of subsidy (tax) restricted trade being inferior (for the assumed, social 
utility index) to no trade, such that no lump-sum transfers could com- 
pensate the losers in the restricted trade situation without leaving the 
gainers worse off. 
Kemp's theorem is again invalid, in general, if we consider yet another 
way in which trade may be reduced below the level of free trade. Even a 
production subsidy (tax) on exportables (importables) may restrict the 
volume of trade below the free-trade level provided exportables are in- 
ferior in social consumption.1 And, regardless of whether trade is reduced 
1 Such a subsidy (tax) may, of course, reverse the trade pattern as well. 
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below or increased above the free trade level, a production subsidy (tax) on 
exportables (importables) can reduce social welfare below the no-trade 
level so that it will, in this case, be impossible to compensate the losers in 
this restricted trade situation while keeping the gainers at their welfare 
level in the initial, no trade situation. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 where the 
subsidy (tax) is assumed to shift production to PT' reduce trade below the 
y 
A C X 
C ~~~~~UF 
0 B X 
FIG. 4. APS B represents the domestic, production possibility curve. Free trade at 
given, world prices measured by the slope of CFPF, would take production to PF 
and consumption to CF. Under no trade, the production and consumption would be 
at Ps and welfare at Us would be below that under free trade at UF. An appropriate 
production subsidy (or, alternatively tax) on the exportable good (or, alternatively 
on the importable good) would shift production from PF to PT, consumption to CT, 
thus reducing the volume of trade below the free-trade level and welfare below the no 
trade level (UT < US), thus demonstrating that restricted trade would, in this 
instance, be inferior to no trade. 
free trade level and produce welfare level below that under no trade 
(UT < US). 
Hence, if subsidies (taxes) on importables and exportables are admitted 
as possible ways of restricting trade, the theorem that restricted trade is 
superior to no trade can no longer be considered valid. 
Further, we have discussed so far only taxes and subsidies on production 
as methods by which trade may be restricted. We may, however, also con- 
sider taxes and subsidies on consumption as possible methods of restricting 
trade. If we do so, Kemp's theorem can be shown again to be invalid, in 
general, for this class of policy instruments.' 
1 Note again that Kemp was implicitly considering restrictions of trade brought about by 
tariffs and equivalent restrictions. What has been demonstrated here is that the theorem is 
not capable of extension, in general, to restrictions of trade brought about by other policy 
instruments (except under restrictive assumptions). 
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Take the case of tax (subsidy) on the consumption of importables (ex- 
portables). In this case, even when fixed resources and absence of monopoly 
power in trade are assumed to simplify the analysis, restricted trade may 
be inferior to no trade. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 where the trade- 
reducing consumption subsidy (tax) on exportables (importables) is shown 




PF\~ ~ U 
CT l 
Pr 
0 B X 
FIG. 5. APS B is the domestic, production possibility frontier. Under no trade, 
production and consumption will be at Ps. Under free trade, at the given world 
price ratio measured by the slope of CF PF, production will be at PF, consumption 
at CF and social welfare at UF. If, however, along with otherwise-free trade, an 
appropriate subsidy (or tax) on the consumption of the exportable good (or of the 
importable good) is introduced, production will continue at PF and consumption 
shift to CT, the volume of trade will have been reduced below the free-trade level 
and welfare below the no-trade level (UT < US), thus demonstrating that, in this 
instance, restricted trade is inferior to no trade. 
that this possibility does not require any restriction on demand, such as 
inferiority of either good in social consumption, as in the case of production 
subsidy (tax) on importables (exportables).1 
III. Higher tariff vs. lower tariff 
A further theorem, stated by Kemp, is that for a country with no 
monopoly power in trade, and without any domestic distortions, a higher 
tariff is inferior to a lower tariff. As Kemp [2, p. 814] states it: 
What can be said of the relative desirabilities of the free-trading situation, the 
trading situation characterized by a uniform 5% import duty, that characterized by 
a 10% duty, etc. ? 
1 On the other hand, if a trade-reducing tax (subsidy) is levied on the consumption of ex- 
portables (importables), this can be shown to result invariably in a higher welfare level than 
under no trade when there is no monopoly power in trade and resources are fixed in supply. 
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In the special case in which a country's terms of trade are independent of that 
country's offer a particularly simple answer can be given: the free-trade situation is 
superior to the 5% situation, which in turn is superior to the 10% situation, and so 
on. The reason is very simple: under free trade all the necessary marginal conditions 
of a Paretian national optimum are satisfied. In particular, the marginal rate of 
transformation between commodities in production is equal to the marginal rate 
of transformation between commodities in international trade (the marginal terms of 
trade) and to their marginal rate of substitution in consumption. A tariff destroys the 
equality between the marginal terms of trade and the other two marginal rates of 
transformation. And the greater the duty, the greater the resulting inequality. 
While Kemp's argument seems valid at a superficial glance, and indeed 
was adopted as such in my own Survey [1], it turns out that it raises certain 
difficulties when inferiority of the exportable good in consumption is not 
ruled out. 
Note that the argument is certainly valid if the ranking of tariffs is made 
on grounds of (what was earlier described as) technical efficiency. However, 
when the question of utility-wise rankings is considered, it can be shown, as 
in Fig. 6, that a higher tariff rate could produce a higher level of welfare 
than a lower tariff rate. It is clear that this contradiction requires that the 
exportables be inferior in social consumption. The volume of trade, in this 
instance, falls instead of increasing as a result of a reduction of the tariff. 
Readers familiar with Meade's [3] cardinalist method of evaluating the 
marginal changes in welfare will notice that the foregoing result can 
naturally be reached by Meade's method as well: a reduction in the volume 
of imports, when there is a tariff, will produce a deterioration of welfare. 
While, however, the presence of an inferior exportable good can result in 
a higher tariff producing higher social welfare than a lower tariff, Professor 
Samuelson has pointed out to me that there will none the less exist other 
equilibrium position(s) under the lower tariff situation which produce a 
higher level of welfare than under the higher tariff, and that my qualifica- 
tion of Kemp's proposition is yet another instance of multiple equilibria 
with associated welfare paradoxes. Thus, if one draws a Hicksian income- 
consumption line at the domestic price ratio under the low tariff, it will go 
through CL and to the left of CH and must necessarily result in other 
equilibrium consumption point(s) further north, involving a higher welfare 
level than under UH?1 
The correct formulation of the valid position concerning the utility-wise 
ranking of higher and lower tariffs would then be that: the (best) utility 
possibility curve under a lower tariff will indeed lie outside that under a 
higher tariff, regardless of inferiority of the exportable good in social con- 
sumption; but a competitive price system could well result in equilibria 
involving a higher welfare level under a higher tariff, unless inferiority of 
1 The problems raised by inferior goods have been noted independently by J. Vanek [7] as 
well; his contribution came to my notice after this paper was complete. 
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the exportable good in social consumption were ruled out. It may be com- 
forting, however, to note that this possibility of a perverse welfare result 
can be shown to require market instability. But, for those who see no 
reason to reject the empirical possibility of market instability, this is small 
comfort indeed. 
Y 
0 B X 
(Exportable) 
FIG. 6. APHP , B is the domestic, production possibility frontier. An appropriate 
tariff will lead to production at PL, consumption at CL, trade at the given world 
price ratio measured by the slope of PL CL and social welfare at UL. An appropriate, 
higher tariff will shift production to PH and consumption to CH, while increasing 
social welfare (UH > UL), so that a higher tariff will be superior to a lower tariff in 
this instance. Note that this case requires the inferiority of the exportable good in 
social consumption; it is impossible to redraw the diagram, with the same con- 
clusions, for the case where the exportable good is not inferior. 
IV. Conclusion 
We have thus established that: 
(1) 'restricted trade is superior to no trade' only if the restriction is 
brought about by tariffs, quotas, or (equivalent) exchange restrictions but 
not if brought about by taxes or subsidies on domestic production or con- 
sumption; and 
(2) 'a higher tariff is (utility-wise) inferior to a lower tariff', for a country 
with neither monopoly power in trade nor domestic distortions, only when 
inferiority of exportables in societal consumption is ruled out; if this is not 
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done, a competitive system may well lead a reduced tariff to result in a 
deterioration of economic welfare, even though the possibility of improved 
economic welfare, at a different equilibrium position with the same 
reduced tariff, will always exist. 
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